Citizen ignorance and political activity
In: Public choice, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 85-99
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 85-99
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 32, S. 85-99
ISSN: 0048-5829
Extended is the theory of coercion developed by A. Breton (The Economic Theory of Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine, 1974) to various conditions of citizen ignorance. Breton hypothesized that a citizen participates in political activities to alter policies which either presently or/& may eventually constrain him from achieving the maximum possible utility for his income level & conception of fairness. This proposition is extended in three steps: (1) a general equilibrium model is derived to replace the partial equilibrium analysis used by Breton, (2) the problem of citizen ignorance is introduced into the model, (3) the impact of the choice of equity rule to guide public decisions is examined. Five possible sources of coercion are identified & examined: (A) government ignorance of citizen preferences (previously treated by Breton), (B) government ignorance of the productive capability of the society, (C) citizen ignorance of one another's preferences & productive capability, (D) incompatibility of equity & efficiency criteria, & (E) disagreement over the proper standard of equity. Political propaganda is an important tool for reducing coercion regardless of the form of government. In cases where the government seeks to maximize societal welfare, propaganda is used to demonstrate the benefits of the resulting policies. However, even if the government does not pursue welfare maximizing goals propaganda is usefully employed to minimize the perceived welfare loss. Thus, while the level of coercion may be independent of real utility loss when citizens are ignorant, the strategy chosen by government to deal with coercion depends upon its policy with respect to the real loss. 6 Figures. AA.
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 585
ISSN: 1939-9162
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 585-593
ISSN: 0362-9805
THE COST OF RUNNING FOR A COUNTY PARLIAMENTARY SEAT IN 19TH-CENTURY BRITAIN WAS ABOUT TWICE THE COST OF RUNNING FOR A BOROUGH SEAT. SINCE THERE WERE NO RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND NO DIFFERENCE IN POLITICAL POWER BETWEEN THE BOROUGH AND COUNTY MP'S, THIS PERSISTENT PRICE DISCREPANCY NEEDS EXPLANATION. HIGHER INFORMATIONAL COSTS IN THE COUNTIES MAY HAVE LED TO FEWER CONTESTED ELECTIONS.